This paper provides an overview of different approaches to policy evaluation. We focus on how different types of uncertainty should be accounted for in the policy evaluation process.
INTRODUCTION
Policy choices by the government can commonly be criticized because such choices are typically justified on the basis of an exaggerated degree of certainty about their effects. This paper describes some ideas to constructively address such criticisms. We call the approach sturdy policy evaluation.
1 For us, sturdy policy evaluation should be understood as an exercise combining theory and empirical evidence to produce conditional forecasts of the effects of a policy. While this might seem obvious, in fact the exclusive focus on policy effects is important because it means that a description of the effect of a current or counterfactual policy necessarily must incorporate all sources of uncertainty that an analyst faces. We ar-gue that certain dimensions of this uncertainty are not appropriately accounted for in standard policy evaluation exercises.
As we are thinking of the use of statistical models to construct policy evaluations, a natural way to understand the total uncertainty associated with a given policy is to decompose this uncertainty into four distinct sources. First, the effects of a policy depend on factors that the policy maker cannot observe or perfectly predict. Second, given a statistical model that links a policy to various socioeconomic outcomes, an analyst faces uncertainty about the parameter values of the model. Third, uncertainty exists about the translation of the substantive theoretical commitments made in a policy analysis into a statistical model. Fourth, uncertainty exists about the empirical validity of the theoretical commitments themselves.
Uncertainty about future variables and about parameter values represent the standard sources of overall uncertainty in statistical exercises. In contrast, uncertainty about functional forms and about theoretical commitments represent model uncertainty since they mean that policy evaluation should not be treated as an exercise that presupposes the truth of a given statistical model. The true level of uncertainty in a given policy evaluation is thus understated in the conventional approach, which is based on only one model. Sturdy policy evaluation should thus be understood as the presentation of policy evaluations in ways that respect model uncertainty.
One response to the presence of model uncertainty, made by Gelman and Rubin (1995) , is that, rather than select among or weight an existing set of models, one should construct more complex models that nest the initial set. For some types of uncertainty, this may not be possible. For example, models with differing commitments about social science theory may appear to be amenable to integration since one can always create a metamodel that is a weighted average of two initial models. But this metamodel may not be a meaningful model; a metamodel created out of one model with assumption x with weight and another model with assumption not x with weight 1 − does not represent an internally coherent description of a socioeconomic process. That said, we certainly do not believe that our approach should trump the construction of new models based on the empirical evidence for a given set. Our approach asks how one should work with a given set of candidate models and so complements the process of model creation.
In addition to making purely positive statements about policy effects, policy evaluation is often comparative, and a policy maker's preferences are employed to conclude that one policy is preferred to another or that a particular policy in some feasible set is optimal. While we primarily focus on reporting policy effects, we also discuss how the nature of the positive information available to a policy maker affects the evaluative criteria that are brought to bear in comparing policies. This interdependence occurs when one cannot assign unique conditional probabilities to the variables over which the policy maker has preferences. In contrast, for environments with fully specified conditional probabilities, one can employ standard or Bayesian statistical decision methods for which preferences and conditional probabilities are treated as distinct objects. More concretely, we distinguish between cases in which the analyst can and cannot provide conditional probabilities for the effects of policies. When conditional probabilities are unavailable, there does not exist a standard statistical decision theory solution for policy evaluation. We discuss alternative ways to proceed and contextualize the analyst's reporting problem for such contexts. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a baseline approach that is common in economic policy making. In this approach, a model is estimated and, conditional on that model, a measure of uncertainty is produced. Section 3 develops a model-averaging approach to capture the notion of model uncertainty. Using Bayesian ideas, the true model of the phenomena under study is treated as an unobservable variable, which provides a straightforward way of converting standard measures of the uncertainty associated with a policy into sturdy measures. Section 4 describes environments for which model uncertainty does not allow probabilities to be assigned to candidate models. Section 5 discusses policy evaluation for settings in which the quality of predictions by economists is likely to be so inaccurate that predictions are of little value. In some of these settings, we discuss the possibility of using recent work on early warning signals of impending regime changes to improve prediction quality. Section 6 describes some cases for which we believe our approach would facilitate sturdy policy evaluation. Section 7 concludes.
A BASELINE APPROACH
In this section, we outline the current canonical approach to policy evaluation under uncertainty. This model represents a baseline against which we consider various generalizations that relax the amount of knowledge assumed to be available to the policy maker.
Consider a policy maker who wishes to choose policy p, taken from a set of feasible policies P, to affect sets of socioeconomic outcomes o; the outcome support is denoted O. A natural way to think about the outcome is to regard it as determined by the policy, some set of observable (to the analyst) variables x, a distinct set of unobservable (to the analyst) variables ε, a model m that characterizes the socioeconomic environment, and a set of parameters θ(m) that index the model. In other words, these different determinants produce an outcome vector o via the relation f:
Our conception of a model is very general in that a model is equated with a set of assumptions that allows one to formulate the outcomes of the policy via equation (1). As such, a model includes both the substantive theoretical social science commitments that are made in the evaluation exercises and the statistical assumptions used to translate the substantive social science commitments into a statistical model. The unobserved heterogeneity ε renders the standard policy evaluation exercise a decision problem under uncertainty. If this heterogeneity can be associated with a conditional probability, that is, Pr(ε|x, m) exists, equation (1) immediately implies that each policy produces a conditional probability on the set of possible outcomes:
This conditional probability summarizes the knowledge that an analyst can bring to a statistical exercise concerning the effects of a policy. To complete the policy evaluation problem, it is necessary to specify a loss function that ranks alternative outcomes. We work with ( , , ) .
This formulation allows for the loss assigned to each outcome to depend on the observables and the model. The dependence on observables allows for losses to be affected by the available data, for example. This allows for losses to differ according to the state of the environment under study.
Dependence of the loss function in the model means that the losses assigned to an outcome may depend on the structure of the environment under study.
Expressions (2) and (3) define the standard optimal policy choice problem in which the optimal policy minimizes the expected loss: min ( , , )Pr( , , ).
This is the classical Bayesian statistical decision problem. We provide this baseline to organize ideas that have emerged in the last decade or so in respecting the information limits that a policy maker faces. These limits will involve formulating expression (2) and, depending on the context, expression (3). Our objective is to ask how a more modest view of a policy maker's knowledge affects policy choice relative to this classical baseline.
MODEL UNCERTAINTY WITH PROBABILITIES
A first type of uncertainty involves the conditioning on a given model m that is done in expressions (1)-(4). When individuals disagree on the correct model through which to make predictions of policy effects, it is obvious that this disagreement will translate, via expression (2), to disagreements about the posterior probability of outcomes given a policy. As suggested in Section 1, disagreements about model choice can involve alternative judgments on substantive social science embedded in the model as well as the translation of the social science into a statistical framework. Disagreements about theoretical commitments are natural in policy debates given the lack of consensus on so many social science questions. For example, alternative views about the effects of types of deregulation typically involve different beliefs about how particular markets function.
How can a policy analyst constructively proceed in the presence of model uncertainty? An approach that has gained increasing attention falls under the rubric of model averaging.
2 Model averaging treats model uncertainty in a Bayesian fashion. Under model averaging, the true model m is treated not as known but rather as an unobservable that lies in some set of candidate models M.
2. The general ideas of model averaging are exposited in Doppelhofer (2008) , Draper (1995), and Hoeting et al. (1999) . Applications of model averaging include Brock, Durlauf, and West (2007) , Cogley and Sargent (2005) , and Cogley et al. (2011) for monetary policy evaluation; Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004), Fernández, Ley, and Steel (2001) , and Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2008) for uncovering empirically salient determinants of economic growth; and Cohen-Cole et al. (2009) and Durlauf, Fu, and Navarro (2013) for evaluating the deterrent effect of capital punishment. There are many applications in this rapidly growing area.
Policy evaluation in the presence of model uncertainty follows the same logical structure as in the baseline model. With reference to predicting policy effects, this means that the object of interest is not expression (2) but rather the conditional probability
where the dependence on M in expression (5) means that the posterior probability of outcomes is conditioned on the assumption that the true model lies in some set M rather than on the assumption that one model is the true one. 3 In other words,
As opposed to conditioning on a single model, conditioning on a set of models is known as model averaging, as the integral in equation (6) takes a weighted (by Pr(m|x)) average of the model-specific probabilities Pr (o|p, x, m) .
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How does model uncertainty change claims about the distribution of outcomes under a given policy? As recognized in Leamer (1978) , the first and second moments of expression (5) are
and
This variance formula, from Leamer (1978) , has been important in the literature on model uncertainty. The formula shows that the variance of outcomes depends not only on a weighted average of the uncertainty for each model but also on the cross-model uncertainty in the expected value of the outcome, relative to the expected-value calculation in expression 3. One can naturally ask about policy evaluation when none of the models are correct. We do not address this important question since it raises issues-most important, the evolution of the model space-that are not well understood and in any event are beyond the scope of this paper.
4. As such, model averaging has conceptual foundations that are distinct from methods that involve combination of forecasts, which are well surveyed in Timmermann (2006) . Forecast-combination methods do not have an explicit information-based justification. Put differently, the model-averaging approach produces particular combinations of forecasts based on the appropriate representation of an analyst's knowledge, whereas the forecast-combination literature is concerned with how to weight forecasts in ways that reduce their error.
(7) that respects the model uncertainty. To see why this is important, suppose that ∀ m, var(o|p, x, m) = K; that is, each model produces the same variance for the outcome given the policy. In this case, the failure to account for model uncertainty leads to an underestimate of the uncertainty of outcomes under the policy, which is the second component of equation (8). Note that the additional uncertainty in the outcomes depends on a weighted average of the value of [E(o|p, x) 
. This term measures (squared) deviations of the model-specific expected values from the expected value that respects model uncertainty. This is intuitive. Even if the policy effect is certain for each model, that is, K = 0, the correct statement to the policy maker is that differences in the predicted effects across models render the policy's effect uncertain.
This additional variance term has been shown to matter in various contexts. For example, in the context of capital punishment, Cohen-Cole et al. (2009) and Durlauf, Fu, and Navarro (2013) find that variation in the cross-model estimates of the deterrent effect of an additional execution produces a variance for these estimates that is an order of magnitude higher than those found in standard studies in the literature. Indeed, the general conclusion of these studies is that the empirical evidence is insufficient to determine whether there is any deterrent effect of capital punishment at all. This conclusion should surely give pause to any policy makers who want to take a strong stand that capital punishment has a deterrent effect.
MODEL UNCERTAINTY WITHOUT MODEL PROBABILITIES
The model uncertainty described in Section 3 assumes that one can construct the posterior model probabilities Pr(m|p, x) to condition out the dependence of policy effects on the choice of a single model. For important classes of policy evaluation problems, these probabilities may not be available. Such environments embody a distinct form of model uncertainty for which additional questions arise.
Why would an analyst be unable to construct posterior model probabilities? The reason can be seen by the standard Bayes's rule representation of the posterior model probability:
As stated in expression (9), the posterior probability of a model is proportional to the product of two factors: the probability of the observ-ables given the model, Pr(x|m), and the prior probabilities assigned to the model, Pr(m). This indicates the first complication in resolving model uncertainty using Bayesian arguments: the lack of a principled basis by which to construct this prior probability (hereafter, prior). By "principled," we mean that the analyst cannot construct a prior based on actual a priori knowledge about models. By itself, the absence of a principled basis for the construction of priors does not represent a good argument against model averaging. Many Bayesians have acknowledged the need to extend Bayesian ideas to contexts for which knowledge-based priors are unavailable. This has led to a rich literature on robust priors and related ideas. Further, in data-rich environments, prior choice may not be all that important. The idea is as follows: As the number of observations grows, the posterior probabilities attached to each model are increasingly dominated by Pr(x|m). The conditional probability Pr(x|m), called the integrated likelihood, measures the likelihood of the data given a model. For many sets of models, it can be shown that for distinct models, the ratio Pr(m"|x)/Pr(m'|x) converges to 0 if m' is the true model and m" is not. This property, often referred to as the likelihood swamping the prior, means that in contexts for which the data are informative of the relative goodness of fits of different models, the choice of the prior will not greatly matter so long as it is not excessively weighted against the true model. We appreciate that this is not a rigorous remark, but it does correctly characterize how one employs model averaging in practice.
However, suppose that it is the case that there exist two models m' and m" such that
If equation (10) holds, the data cannot differentiate between the likelihood of the two models. As a result, the posterior model weights are determined by the priors, namely,
In other words, the data cannot speak to the relative model probabilities. In econometrics, this is what is meant by saying that models m' and m" are not identified relative to one another. More generally, when a statistical object (such as an expected policy effect) is either not identified or partially identified, this can be understood as saying that there is a set of models (indexed by admissible values of the statistical object) all of which obey equation (11). This is where the absence of a principled basis for prior construction matters. As indicated by equation (11), the posterior weights assigned to models will be entirely determined by their prior probabilities. In such cases, any averaging is completely arbitrary since it is based on assigned probabilities (the Pr(m) values), which have no relation to actual model probabilities. When model averaging cannot be done, then the analyst is, from the perspective of communication, obliged to report Pr(o|p, m, x) across the cross product of the policy and model sets, P × M. The cardinality of this object can be very high; no policy maker can reasonably be expected to process a large set of conditional probabilities. Brock, Durlauf, and West (2007) propose that, for this context, policy makers should be provided with value dispersion plots. For each policy, one can report a histogram of the expected values of the policy effects across the policy space. This histogram implicitly assigns equal weight to each model. One can also construct weighted histograms in which the posterior model probabilities are replaced with credibility values. By this we mean that each model is assigned a data-disciplined measure of credibility, for example, a relative likelihood value. These weights are used for producing histograms. Because these credibility numbers are not treated as probabilities, one cannot reduce the histogram to expression (2).
In addition to value dispersion plots, one can also construct policy dispersion plots. One can ask the following question: how does the solution to expression (4), an optimal policy, vary over the model space? This involves constructing a histogram of optimal policy rule parameters.
Our appeals to these diagrams allow a policy maker to employ the following heuristics in making policy choices. A policy maker should feel most comfortable making a choice when the variations in the payoffs of the policy are relatively small as one moves across the policy space, for those models with credibility values above some threshold, and/or when the policy is relatively close to the model-specific optimal policies across the parameter space.
This approach takes a particular stance on the role of the analysis. As described in West (2003, 2007) , we do not believe that it is the researcher's job to impose his preferences on the policy maker even if that policy maker's preferences are elicited by some procedure. Our position is that the researcher's job is to inform the policy maker about potential outcomes associated with his potential choices and to report an honest assessment of underlying uncertainties about those outcomes. We argue that it is informative for the policy maker to see these dispersion plots, as they can help a policy maker decide what to do.
If one wants to move beyond reporting the possible effects of policies when priors are available for the provision of rankings of policy rules, it is necessary to consider decision-theoretic foundations different from the classical Bayesian expected-loss-function approach. Socio economic environments without knowledge of probabilities on certain objects (in our case, models) but with knowledge of supports exhibit what is known as ambiguity.
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Decision making under ambiguity has been an active area of research. Various approaches for this abstract problem in essence take the set of probability distributions under each candidate model and consider the model-specific payoff distributions. Rules are then constructed for comparing these sets. The classic minimax solution is defined by min max ( , , )Pr( , , ),
which says that the optimal policy is the one whose maximum modelspecific expected loss is smallest. As such, the minimax decision rule formalizes the intuitive notion of guarding against worst-case scenarios.
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Minimax approaches are commonly criticized because of their extreme conservatism. A sophisticated variation of the minimax approach has been developed by Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent and is called robust control to emphasize that it is employed in an intertemporal environment; Hansen and Sargent (2007) synthesizes their work. Hansen and Sargent work with model uncertainty relative to a baseline model. Conceptually, this means that model uncertainty exists relative to a priori knowledge that is sufficient to generate a model of the environment under study. However, deviations from the model are to be accounted for in policy choice. These deviations are not associated with probabilities. Hansen and Sargent argue in favor of minimax policy choice over a set of models surrounding the baseline model. 7 If one constructs the model 5. This discussion is motivated by Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) formulation of ambiguity as an environment in which multiple priors instead of a single prior are present. Further, there does not exist a probability density over the multiple priors.
6. The well-known extreme-bounds analysis of Leamer (1983) , in which a coefficient estimate is said to be fragile if its sign flips across a model space, can be interpreted as a minimax criterion (Brock, Durlauf, and West 2003) .
7. Hansen et al. (2006, pp. 51-61) develop a relationship between a robust-control approach and the max-min expected-utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) that builds on the multiple-priors framework. As such, the approach has rigorous decisiontheoretic foundations.
space as local to a given baseline, the models will not be distinguishable in terms of their goodness of fit given the finite sample of data available. Thus, Hansen and Sargent avoid one problem with minimax, which is the lack of attention to what the data say about the relative likelihood of models under consideration.
Hansen and Sargent are careful in the way they use minimax and robust control by evaluating the results obtained for each contextual application of their method and making a case for the sensibility of their findings for that particular contextual application. For example, consider how Ellison and Sargent (2012) use robust control in their defense of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) against a critique by Romer and Romer (2008) . They argue, "In our view the FOMC may be setting policy rationally to guard against model misspecification by responding to worst case scenarios" (Ellison and Sargent 2012, p. 1049) . They go on to develop a cogent argument to show that the FOMC is acting as if it wants policies that are robust to potential specification errors in the staff's model. To make this case, they argue that the FOMC's published forecasts are systematically biased away from the staff forecasts and toward the worst-case scenarios consistent with an application of robust control by the FOMC. Their argument is intricate and comprehensive, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover it in detail. The point we are making is that use of robust control, even in the face of valid critiques of the pessimism of minimax, is informative and useful when it is applied with proper care.
The conservatism of minimax has led a number of researchers, such as Manski (2008, 2011, 2013) and Schlag (2007; Schlag and Zapechelnyuk 2009) to advocate the use of the minimax regret criterion, originated by Savage (1951) . Under this decision rule, each policy-model pair is associated with a regret value, R(p, m):
Regret thus measures, given a model, the difference between the expected loss of a policy and the expected loss of the optimal policy given that model. The optimal policy under minimax regret is min max ( , ).
Optimal policies under minimax regret differ from minimax in many in-teresting cases. In particular, minimax regret produces a hedging of one's decision making against other possible cases besides the worst case (see, for example, Manski 2013). Brock (2006) shows that the mixing property of minimax regret allows rapid learning compared with the conservative minimax criterion. However, decision making under the minimax regret criterion is known to permit violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom. 8 The IIA assumption in essence means that the choice of A over B or B over A should not be affected by the presence or absence of a third choice C. See Klibanoff (2013) for a nice discussion of this issue.
The IIA violation is often regarded as demonstrating that the decisiontheoretic foundations of minimax regret are flawed, since IIA is generally regarded as a natural requirement of rationality. Stoye (2011) shows that minimax regret can be derived from standard choice axioms if one replaces IIA with independence of always dominated alternatives, which means that the optimal choice is not affected by the introduction of a choice that is never optimal, regardless of the resolution of the uncertainty. This does not address the objection to minimax regret: that it can lead to a violation of rationality.
Manski (2011) provides a direct response to this critique of minimax regret. He argues that the only restriction that rationality places on choice is that strictly dominated choices are never made: any choice is justified so long as there is a state of nature under which it is optimal. This argument would, if accepted, mean the following. Suppose that there are two drugs, one of which prevents a disease with a probability of .8, and the other prevents it with a probability of .2. Assume that these probabilities derive from the fact that, for a given individual, there is some unobservable physiological heterogeneity, so if one samples enough individuals, 80 percent of the population would have a disease prevented if the first drug is taken and 20 percent would if the second drug is employed. Manski rejects the claim that the decision to choose drug 2 is irrational since it may prove to be the case that it is efficacious when drug 1 is not. In other words, frequentist probabilities describe what will happen, on average, under repetition, but the decision problem is not something that is repeated. As such, Manski is raising an old question in philosophy: how can the fact that an action may be justified on average be used to justify an action in a given instance? One response, which Putnam (1986) as-8. This defect of minimax regret was first recognized in Chernoff (1954). cribes to Charles Sanders Peirce, is that rationality implies prescription: my action should be consistent with a rule that I would recommend to others. Putnam (1986) does not find this fully persuasive and suggests that the use of frequentist probabilities in characterizing rational decisions should be treated as an assumption. We find the Peirce argument persuasive since it is equivalent to the decision rule that would be recommended by a social planner who wishes to maximize expected average welfare across a set of identical individuals who each take one of two drugs. In our view, rationality requires good reasons for a course of action, and the choice of drug 2 in the example does not have any. Therefore, we believe that strict dominance is not sufficient to characterize a rational choice. We are not aware of a persuasive argument that justifies minimax regret in light of the IIA violation.
How does our more modest dispersion-plot approach relate to both minimax and minimax regret? Leaving aside the distinct problems with minimax regret, we find common reasons to question both criteria. 9 One concern is that both approaches are subject to the pessimism problem we have described. For minimax and minimax regret, each decision criterion will be equivalent to expected-loss minimization for a particular prior on the model space. By this we mean that for each criterion, there is a prior on the model space such that the solution of the Bayesian decision problem coincides with the criterion. In fact, the minimax criterion is equivalent to expected-loss maximization under a dogmatic prior that assigns a probability of 1 to one of the models for which the minimax solution produced a lower expected loss than any other policy. If no such model existed, the policy would not be minimax. 10 The same is true for minimax regret, only the model assigned a probability of 1 is one for which the minimax regret policy dominates others in terms of risk rather than the expected level of the loss. In neither case is the equivalent prior a principled one; that is, neither prior reflects actual knowledge, although each implements a decision rule on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity.
9. We focus on problems that apply regardless of whether decisions are made once or repeatedly. Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) show that these approaches can also lead to inconsistencies when employed in dynamic contexts because of complications with how one learns in a dynamic environment.
10. The link between minimax and a particular Bayesian prior is complicated when one considers policies in dynamic environments. Hansen and Sargent (2007, theorem 7.7 .1 and sec. 7.7.4) demonstrate how to construct a Bayesian decision rule with respect to a prior for such contexts.
But this means that each is based on an ad hoc form of pessimism that can lead to absurd results when global model uncertainty is present.
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The upshot of this discussion is that, in our judgment, there does not exist a compelling axiomatic solution to decision making under ambiguity. Approaches such as minimax and minimax regret do not address the fact that some models are more plausible than others, even when probabilities are not available. Our view is that heuristic rules in such environments can be given conceptual justification but that these heuristics will involve judgments that cannot be axiomatized.
We conclude this section with remarks on how to return to the expected-loss framework when an analyst does not possess principled prior information. The logic of model averaging can easily incorporate uncertainty about the prior, if the uncertainty can be described probabilistically. In other words, if one can assign probabilities to the space of model priors, then one can apply the model-averaging approach to priors as well as models. Gustafson and Clarke (2004) show that the conventional reliance on a single prior in equation (8) can be extended to include a component that captures prior uncertainty. This component will add another term of the characterization of the uncertainty of an empirical claim beyond the intermodal variance term found in equation (8). We believe that this is potentially a very fruitful direction to pursue. Gustafson (2005) suggests an alternative way to proceed in the presence of unidentified model parameters. In his analysis, priors exist for parameters of interest, so nonidentification of some parameters means that these parameters have a posterior density that depends only on the identified parameters. Gustafson suggests that for such cases, expansion of the baseline model to one in which identification holds is a useful strategy. His argument is that there are nontrivial contexts such that the failure of identification stems from the lack of the richness of the model. Can model expansion work in practice? One case in which this is possible is the analysis of social interactions, where identification problems are common, especially for linear-in-means models (Blume et al. 2011; Brock and Durlauf 2001a, 2001b) . Imagine a policy maker who entertains a set of models M, some of which are not identified under social interactions. 12 Brock and Durlauf (2001b, 2007) show that extending the nonidentified 11. As discussed in Sheehan (2009, p. 181) , John von Neumann advocated a preemptive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union in the 1950s. It is easy to show how this could be either a minimax (von Neumann's rationale) or a minimax regret solution.
12. Many important policy issues, for example, in the economics of education, are centered on the nature of social interactions.
linear-in-means model by accounting for the presence of self-selection allows the extended model to be identified.
We put forth this possibility for consideration, as we believe that concerns about nonidentification and partial identification should not be addressed solely by retreating to either heuristics or formal rules for decision making under ambiguity. For many policy-relevant cases, notably treatment effects, the identification failures typically result from ignoring the socioeconomic richness of the environment under study. We believe that it makes much sense to expand nonidentified models by adding model richness, as occurs when one expands a social interactions model to account for choices concerning group memberships. This exercise may involve additional assumptions, but dependence on additional assumptions can be evaluated only in context; that is, assumptions are not equally implausible. Further, the atheoretical approaches one finds in the treatment-effect literature also involve assumptions, although their economic content is often ignored because the assumptions are written in statistical rather than social science language. See Heckman (2000 Heckman ( , 2005 for a comprehensive discussion of the role of assumptions in empirical social science.
RADICAL UNCERTAINTY
We now consider a final level of uncertainty. So far, all methods we have discussed presuppose the ability to assign payoffs under alternative models of the phenomena of interest. Even when probabilities were not available, the support of o was taken as known to the analyst.
Is knowledge of the support problematic? One example in which the support of o is not knowable is technical change. Knowledge of the support of future technologies is impossible since this knowledge would require that they are either contemporaneous technologies or can be extrapolated from contemporaneous technologies in a known fashion. Popper ([1957] 2002, p. 153) raises issues involving the unknowability of the determinants of technical change when he criticizes claims about the immutability of scientific and industrial progress because of the possibility of environmental factors-"losses due to an unmanageable natural environment."
That said, the critique's force is very much context dependent. The inability to characterize the support of future technologies is qualitatively different from characterizing the support of unemployment under alter-native policy rules. There is no good evidence that the economy is so nonstationary that exercises of the latter type are meaningless. Second, the lack of knowledge of the support of outcomes for each model may not mean that policies cannot be compared in terms of their effects on the outcomes. Following Popper ([1957] 2002, pp. 154-55) , there are good reasons to think that policies that discourage "the free competition of scientific thought" will reduce the technology frontier; in turn, one may have ways of characterizing the welfare consequences of these losses.
A related reason why payoffs may be unavailable for alternative economic models is the complexity of the economy. This argument is usually associated with Friedrich von Hayek; Hayek (1967) is a good exposition. Gaus (2007, p. 158) elaborates this argument on the basis of the idea that the economy is a complex system: "The crux of complexity theory is that our predictions about what will occur are likely to be wrong. There is, then, a very strong case that our interventions are not apt to be expedient because we have radically incomplete knowledge."
The critique thus argues that expert knowledge is so delimited that policy effects cannot be compared, even in a probabilistic sense. To put it another way, in the example of the action dispersion plots and value dispersion plots discussed in Section 2, the Hayek-Gaus critique would imply that expert knowledge is so limited that these plots would show wide dispersion, with many widely different models having substantial credibility. Indeed, this may be a key example for which the scientific team of economic advisors should present the policy maker with the action dispersion and value dispersion plots (Brock, Durlauf, and West 2007) and tell him that is all that the science and the data can produce. Production of these kinds of plots is one way that economic scientists can be useful even when predictions are of a quality too low to be useful. This is so because the policy maker can still use the plots to assist him in making a decision on the basis of his own preferences.
A different approach to policy evaluation in complex environments may rely on the fact that such environments may exhibit emergent properties that are amenable to some prediction. By "emergent properties," we refer to properties of an environment that apply to the aggregates of a population of interacting agents. For many complex dynamic systems there are early warning signals (EWSs) of emerging bifurcations (Scheffer et al. 2009 (Scheffer et al. , 2012 Brock and Carpenter 2010) . This means that as some feature of the system changes, there are qualitative regularities in how the feature translates into the behavior of the system. Leading examples of such EWSs are increasing variance and increasing first-order autocorrelation before a bifurcation that is driven by a slow-moving variable. A promising line of future research is to study whether these kinds of EWSs might be used to improve prediction in the setting of complex systems that are relevant to economics. It is important to keep in mind, however, that many regime changes in complex systems are not caused by bifurcations, and there are examples of bifurcations occurring that have no EWSs.
One important challenge to the use of EWSs in the socioeconomic context involves feedback from attempts to predict into the dynamics being predicted. This possibility, which is present in many social systems-for example, financial market systems-is largely absent in natural systems. Further, although it has been argued that EWSs exist for whole-lake experiments (Carpenter et al. 2011 ) and laboratory-organism dynamics (see, for example, Chen et al. [2014] and other references listed on the website of the Gore Lab), 13 this literature is still too new to have generated enough examples in dynamics of living systems in contrast to simulation exercises in models. We say more about this approach to managing human-dominated ecosystems below.
EXAMPLES

Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment
The empirical literature on the deterrent effect of capital punishment, measured as the expected change in the number of murders in a state when there is one more execution, is a good example in which different studies come to different conclusions using identical or nearly identical data sets. A prominent example is Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) , who use county-wide data to conclude that each execution saves 17 lives. Shepherd (2005) considers models in which the deterrence effect differs across states; when the number of executions is small, a brutalization effect leads to more murders, while in states with relatively more executions, this effect is trumped by deterrence. Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2010) argue that if one models the aggregate murder rate as the aggregation of many individual binary (murder or not murder) decisions, the resultant logistic probability structure produces no evidence of de- terrence. They further argue that the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd model uses incorrect microeconomic foundations that, if corrected, increase the estimated deterrent effect.
14 Durlauf, Fu, and Navarro (2013) argue that one must also consider the possibility that those counties for which no executions occur in a given time period are endogenous and thereby raise a selection problem. Durlauf, Fu, and Navarro (2013) construct a value dispersion plot across this model space. There is a clear pattern in the dispersion plot, as seen in Figure 1 . 15 The assumptions of a linear probability model and a common deterrent effect across states are necessary and sufficient to produce a deterrent effect, while for all other specifications the parameter estimates imply that the murder rate increases in the number of executions. This paper also finds that the intermodel uncertainty swamps the intramodel uncertainty in the sense that variation across the model-specific estimates is so large that the model-averaged (under a uniform model prior) deterrence estimates are so imprecise as to be unhelpful.
Food and Drug Administration Drug Approval and Radical Uncertainty
We next consider a case in which we would argue that radical uncertainty should be central to policy evaluation: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval regime. Under the current approval regime, after a trial protocol a drug is either universally approved (that is, no limits are imposed on extent of use) or rejected. Authors of a number of studies (Berry 2006 (Berry , 2011 Manski 2007 Manski , 2009 argue that the approval protocol is flawed. One reason for revising the approval process is that there may be differences between the drug effects found in the trials and the effects for the population as a whole. Another reason is that this single universal decision rule ignores the fact that information on drug efficacy grows over time, and so the FDA should allow partial approval rules as well as adaptive trial designs that can be justified on decision-theoretic grounds.
14. A separate challenge to Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) is made by Donohue and Wolfers (2005) , who find that minor statistical modifications of the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd specification can produce estimates that each execution increases the number of murders by as much as 50. Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (2011) respond that most specifications with modifications such as those made by Donohue and Wolfers find a deterrence effect. Cohen-Cole et al. (2009) provide dispersion plots and modelaveraging estimates to resolve the disagreements, concluding that model uncertainty means that one cannot choose between the competing analyses.
15. In Figure 1 , the vertical axis represents net lives saved; the horizontal axis indexes models in a model-averaging exercise for a state with the death penalty in 1996.
These recommendations for changes in the drug approval regime are made under the assumption that the change has no effect on the innovation process for new drugs. In our view, the superior-inference argument for changes in FDA approval cannot be assessed without taking a stance on how the link from the argument to a policy recommendation does or does not depend on how one thinks about the innovation process. From the vantage point of the superior-inference argument, the change in approval regime for drug innovations introduces radical uncertainty for the policy maker; effects on drug approval do not admit characterization of the support, let alone probabilities. This does not mean that the change should not be made. But it requires judgments that can rely on what is known about technological innovation and about the nature of this uncertainty. No algorithmic decision rule is available.
Where does this leave us in terms of policy assessment? We argue that calls for changes in the FDA regime that do not address the potential effects on drug discovery have failed to account for the radical uncertainty involved in the innovation process. We can imagine ways of addressing the absence of such an analysis and so would conclude that without it the proposals have not met an appropriate level of justification. Does this imply that we support some sort of precautionary principle in the presence of radical uncertainty? 16 We do not. Rather, we make the narrower claim that the implications for innovation are sufficiently central to the choice of approval regime that they need to be explicitly addressed.
16. We thank Charles Manski for raising this question. 
Environmental Policy
Environmental regulation, management of human-impacted ecosystems, and general environmental policy making are areas that cry out for sturdy policy evaluation. These are areas where, in many cases, a single model or even a single benchmark model for application of some types of robust control methodology may not be appropriate. It may be difficult to give proper rationales for assigning objective or subjective probabilities to different outcomes. The usual policy concerns in this area include how to manage the tradeoff between exploitation and sustainability of increasingly human-dominated ecosystems and how to manage the increasing flow of negative externalities, for example, damages to natural capital, environmental pollution, and so forth, from economic exploitation of natural systems.
Many writers argue for the application of a precautionary principle such as "first, do no harm" in these areas. Notions of precautionary principles are important in the environmental policy literature, although some argue that strong versions of the principle are flawed and not useful for practical policy making (Sunstein 2002-3) . While Sunstein (2002-3) states explicitly that the form of the precautionary principle he critiques is not the maximin principle, the robust-control approach has in fact played a role in recent thinking about the precautionary principle. Examples of the Hansen and Sargent (2007) approach include Funke and Paetz (2011) and Vardas and Xepapadeas (2010) . We suspect that Sunstein and other critics may think that the use of maximin in robust-control approaches is too conservative because it does not take into account the other side of the coin, that is, that precaution can turn out to be unnecessary and that society pays a cost for such excessive precaution in terms of forgone opportunities. This might be so even in a context in which the size of the set of alternative models surrounding a baseline model is disciplined such that each model in that set is difficult to distinguish from the baseline model given a finite sample of data, as occurs in Hansen and Sargent (2007) . Iverson and Perrings (2012) deal with the issue of trying to balance appropriate precaution with appropriate concern for the value of lost opportunities from overly cautious policy by using the climate policy example to stress that policy makers can make two kinds of potentially serious mistakes: applying too-stringent abatement of greenhouse gases when it turns out not to be necessary (for example, by applying too strong a version of the precautionary principle) and not abating enough when it turns out to be necessary and thus seriously damaging the climate. Should the policy maker choose abatement policy assuming some kind of worst-case scenario for the climate's response, or should the policy maker do some kind of balancing act against the two types of mistakes? Iverson and Perrings (2012) develop a variation on maximin regret rather than maximin and argue that their approach captures a sensible notion of precaution and proportionality. Might one do better than this if one has some kind of advance warning that the climate system is being stressed to the point of potentially tipping into an undesirable state (Lenton et al. 2008; Levermann et al. 2012) ?
Many ecological systems, including the climate system, are non linear enough that emergent bifurcations are a significant concern to policy makers. Levin et al. (2012) hint at the potential use of EWSs to improve policy making in this area. Lenton et al. (2008) and Levermann et al. (2012) discuss potential tipping points in the climate system and the possible use of EWSs of these tipping points as alerts for preventative action. However, to be used in policy making, EWS theory must move beyond the recent prolific theoretical work in this area. See, for example, Dakos and Hastings (2013) for a comprehensive review of recent research.
Early warning signals have been documented in laboratory systems of living organisms. But for the use of EWSs to be promising for policy purposes, they need to be documented in a field system. This is done in a recent study for whole-lake systems (Carpenter et al. 2011) . Since there are many lake systems, one can exploit learning and pay the price of losing a few systems to unpleasant alternative stable states, for example, eutrophication, in order to learn how to prevent a large number of such systems from tipping without being overly cautious. However, there is only one climate system, and a cautious approach may be appropriate in this case when tipping points may be possible and when EWS may give a yellow light to increase mitigation efforts (Lenton et al. 2008; Levermann et al. 2012) .
On the basis of this work and ongoing work on field studies, we are willing to predict that EWS theory will increasingly be used to guide policy interventions to prevent emergent eutrophication in lake systems and related systems. There is even now ongoing work investigating the use of EWSs in dynamic systems that are similar enough to ecological dynamics that appear in other areas of science, for example, medical practice. A recent application to medical practice is the use of EWSs in the development of potentially useful interventions for migraines (Scheffer, van den Berg, and Ferrari 2013) . Carpenter et al. (2011) is not the only example to date of EWSs studied for living organisms rather than simulation exercises using models. Drake and Griffen (2010) show in a laboratory system of living organisms that there are EWSs of impending extinction as the environment deteriorates. Litzow, Mueter, and Urban (2013) show that rising variability precedes historical collapses of fisheries in Alaska but also caution that evidence is poor for other EWS indicators in their study. These studies suggest that EWS work has promise for improving management of human-dominated ecosystems, especially ecosystems in which human activities are pushing species to the edge of extinction. More studies on living organisms are appearing, for example, Chen et al. (2014) and other works from the Gore Laboratory for Ecological Systems Biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. As more studies of EWSs in laboratory settings involving living organisms and more field-based studies of EWSs appear, we will have a better idea of the ultimate usefulness of EWS work for policy, especially in areas involving human-dominated natural systems like ecological systems, fisheries, and the like.
We realize that anything we said above about the potential application of the recent work on EWSs to policy making in environmental management is highly speculative, but the promise of this research requires us to alert the readers of this article to this rapidly emerging literature and its possible relevance to environmental policy making.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has attempted to outline a set of tools for describing and evaluating alternative policies under realistic views of the limits to knowledge possessed by a policy maker. Our approach is a modest version of Bayesian decision making, by which we mean that whenever probabilities can be quantified, we believe that standard tools for representing uncertainty and evaluating decisions under uncertainty generalize in a straightforward fashion via explicit attention to model uncertainty. For cases of radical uncertainty, we question the utility of recent work on decision making under ambiguity, at least for cases in which the ambiguity is not local to a baseline model. 
